UN Special on Red China. Interview of Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretarty of State for Far Easter Affairs.
UN Special on Red China. Interview of Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretarty of State for Far Easter Affairs.
UN Special on Red China. Interview of Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretarty of State for Far Easter Affairs.
UN Special on Red China. Interview of Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretarty of State for Far Easter Affairs.
Robert MacNeil. We also have with us this evening Roger Hilsman who was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in the Kennedy Administration, and had knowledge on US Asian policy. Mr. Hilsman, do you think as Secretary Rogers and others who ve said the expulsion of Taiwan is a perilous course? Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs. Well I gather that s what their saying but do you mean do I agree with it? Robert MacNeil. Do you agree with it? Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs. Well I think that the American government must make an effort along the lines that they re making. I think they have to do so if for no other reason than to show that their heart s in the right place. How perilous it is, is another question.
UN Special on Red China. Interview of Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretarty of State for Far Easter Affairs.
Sander Vanocur. Mr. Hilsman, to take what you just said isn t it a case of putting it so that their words are in the right place because after all, we ve now had successive administrations, Democratic and Republican saying we will absolutely preserve the territorial integrity of Taiwan with reference to what Roberts said. Well didn t we? Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs. No I don t think so. Sander Vanocur. Alright, President Truman puts the seventh fleet in the Formosa straits Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs. No, I think that it would be more correct, historically correct to say that the United States has opposed any change by military force. Now we ve fuzzed a little bit on who belongs to what, but the most recent position and the original position was that the issue of whether Taiwan was part of mainland China was still moot, still under discussion, and I think we returned to that position. But what we have said is that we didn t want this issue settled by military force.
UN Special on Red China. Interview of Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretarty of State for Far Easter Affairs.
Sander Vanocur. Well, if I may pursue that, as a man who in now doing history and who has been a historian, what was the force of this feeling about China that lasted for so long until you as Assistant Secretary of State representing the Kennedy Administration, put so to speak, your toe in the water in San Francisco right before the President s? Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs. Mr. Hilsman. Put our neck in the noose. Sander Vanocur. There s an example. There s an example. Why would you say put your neck in the noose after all those years? Why is it so pervasive? Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs. Well I think it goes deep into the American psyche. President Kennedy came in clearly with an idea of changing our China policy. John Foster Dallas had said that Communism on the mainland was a passing phase and our policy should assist its passing. By the time Kennedy became President it was clear this was a false assumption. Communism was going to be there and stay there and we better make our adjustments to it. We tried in 61, we were going to recognize Mongolia but it became very clear that if we did this the alliance for progress would go down the drain on Capitol Hill and so would our policy towards Africa, so we backed off. But by 1963 Kennedy wanted to change it and the speech that I made was in effect called the open door speech , it was saying we were ready for reconciliation. We will stand by our commitments that Taiwan status not be changed by force, no bloodshed. But we were ready for reconciliation with China. Kennedy was killed and because Mr. Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam we weren t able to go any further than that. But I think a lot of Presidents have wanted to do something about it, but it was just either the general American public wasn t ready for it or even after the general public, I think in 1963 when I made that speech the reaction was very favorable amongst the public, but the organized interest groups, the opposition on Capitol Hill, the Committee For One Million, were just too much for us.
UN Special on Red China. Interview of Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretarty of State for Far Easter Affairs.
Robert MacNeil. Mr. Hilsman, what harm has it done America or has it in fact not done harm but defended American interests to follow the policy we have been pursuing both Democratic and Republican Governments these 21 years? Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs. Well I think it s hurt us because I think that the rest of the world has perceived the reality of the situation that is the Communist government was here to stay, long before we were ready to admit it. You have this terribly frustrating and confusing situation where individuals on Capitol Hill or throughout the government are eager to change it but nobody ready to stick their necks out to be the first one. And there was a feeling that it wouldn t work, you couldn t get it done. But I think that it has hurt us in the sense that the United States has been perceived by our friends and our enemies as not facing up to the reality of the world, as being too tied up in our own domestic politics.
UN Special on Red China. Interview of Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretarty of State for Far Easter Affairs.
Robert MacNeil. Would you go as far to say that the Korean War or the Vietnam War would be greatly different if they had happened, had we recognized Red China much earlier? Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs. Well I think here again, this no time to go deeply into the history. Up to the Korean War we had not committed ourselves in this way. It was the Korean War that got us into this in a sense. Now it s lost now to history but Truman put the seventh fleet between Formosa and the mainland as much to keep Chungai Sur from mudding the waters as he did to keep the Chinese from taking Formosa. But we got into this thing because of the Korean War and because of Joe McCarthyism. Once into it, it was just awfully hard to shake, partly because China is a long way away. It s not immediate. It there s a terrible lag here. I think it s hurt us. I think that sometime there, I think Mr. Dulles set us back a lot by his moralistic approach to these things. His militant anti-communism. I think that if some time after the Korean War and before 1965, if we d been successful in 1961 in reconciling things, we might have avoided the Vietnam War. I don t think we could have avoided the Korean War because of this.
UN Special on Red China. Interview of Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretarty of State for Far Easter Affairs.
Sander Vanocur. Mr. Hilsman, one quick question we have just a few seconds left. Is there any doubt in your mind that China means to stick to its word it will not enter the UN if Taiwan is retained here? Any doubt in your mind? Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs. Well let s put it this way I think that the odds are very heavily that they will stand on this. I think the odds are it is pretty heavy they will get the vote. I think I can conceive of a possible situation where they might go along with a proposition that everybody accepted the fact that Taiwan and China, but that they would permit an observer status, perhaps even a general assembly status. I can conceive of it, but I think it is a very remote possibility. Robert MacNeil. Thanks very much Mr. Hilsman.