Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (2/2)
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (2/2)
[01.26.30] Mr. JENNER. I think that provision of article I would not prevent the introduction of evidence in the area. But the problem presented is whether that it is sufficiently specific in a charging sense to be able, to assert that the failure to respond to the subpena is itself an impeachable offense. Mr. THORNTON. Well, based on that answer then, it seems that we are faced with the very real issue of giving a proper consideration to the failure of the President to comply with our subpenas. I think that it is important that in approaching this we should be aware that here we are dealing with directly and intimately a matter which can have a bearing upon the constitutional basis of power between the three departments of Government, and that what we may do with regard to the adoption of this article is going to in one way or another possibly affect the future of those balances. If we do nothing, we may indeed limit the authority of the legislative branch to make a proper inquiry as to the misconduct under the impeachment provision of individuals in either the executive or judiciary branches of Government. If, on the other hand we draw too broadly upon our power and authority, we might distort the balance of power to give the legislative branch under its impeachment clause the authority to constitutionally investigate and determine the actions of members of the executive or judicial branches of Government For this reason it seems to me that, if this article is to be given consideration, it must be sharply limited and defined to the presence. of offenses established by the other evidence which might rise to the level of impeachable offenses. And that is the purpose and effect of the perfecting amendment which I have offered and which I ask the members to adopt, because it seems to me that we are confronted with the very serious problem in Presidential noncompliance with our subpenas, but that we must draw carefully limiting language to prevent a distortion of the balance of power between the executive and the legislative branch. I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. FROEHLICH. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin. Mr. Froehlich. Mr. FROEHLICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, and the gentleman from Arkansas, no matter how sharply limited and defined you try to draw this article, this is clearly an indication of alleged absolute power of the President versus the alleged absolute power of the Congress, a classic, case in separation of powers. The President claims constitutional and historic tradition of executive privilege and the Congress claims --exclusive power of impeachment. What reasonable men would not properly place this Impasse before the third branch, the courts for final arbitration and decision in both in the interests of obtaining information or substantiating the President's compliance or noncompliance under the Constitution. Clearly, the President has asserted his constitutional responsibility vested in him in article II to protect the office of the Presidency against, the infringements of other branches. This argument was also advanced by the President in responding to subpenas sought by the Special Prosecutor. In fact the President used the courts all the way up to and including the Supreme Court to advance his position. What the Supreme Court said in the United States v. Nixon in response to the President's argument is vitally important for this committee to understand. It said that in the performance of assigned constitutional duties, each branch of the Government must initially interpret the constitution and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due respect from the other. [01.31.26]