Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (1/2)
Impeachment Hearings: House Judiciary Committee, July 30, 1974 (1/2)
[00.13.46] Mr. WIGGINS. Will the gentleman yield ? Mr. MEZVINSKY. And I will yield now to Mr. Danielson for 5 minutes. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa is advised that he has now consumed 21 minutes ON the 60 minutes and there are, 39 minutes remaining , -1 and the gentleman from Michigan has consumed 12 minutes and there are 48 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Iowa. Mr. MEZVINSKY/ I now yield to the gentleman from California. Mr. Danielson, for 5 minutes. The, CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California. Mr. DANIELSON. The first little comment I -would like to make, I wish to make one thing clear in the record. Three of our members have stated ,it one time or another in these proceedings that the President cannot be indicted for a criminal offense while, he is in, office, I want to point out. that in my opinion that is an incorrect statement of the law. It is a -wholly gratuitous comment, and I do not agree with it, and I feel that the record should reflect it is not the opinion of the committee officially. The amendment which has just offered and accepted, offered by Mr. Wiggins, accepted by Mr. Mezvinsky, and adopted by the committee to add the word "fraudulently" into the operative portion of this article , I want to point out that was as not just a fine semantic difference. This is a very carefully calculated, very intentional amendment because by adding the term "fraudulently" after "knowingly" we have lifted the degree of the offense which could be charged by- this article against the President from that of a civil matter to one at least in the context of criminal tax fraud which requires a very high burden, A very high degree of proof a willfulness, Knowingly, intentionally, for perverse purpose Or whatnot. But it remained put on there for a good reason. I feel that if we are going to impeach a President for tax fraud it probably should be fraud of the highest degree. But, at least let's not assume that it slipped our mind that fraudulently is not a very significant word In this article. There was one other very interesting point. Since, this is not a criminal proceeding and if the House should impeach and the Senate should try on the ground of tax fraud and not find a conviction, since it, is not a criminal proceeding It would not be jeopardy barring a subsequent prosecution. When we consider this particular article, I want all of the members please to bear in mind Mr. Chairman that we do not consider matters of this type in a vacuum. When we consider the burden of proof in a tax fraud case or in any other- case of this type, we must consider and weigh all of the evidence against the background of common sense. The conclusions and impressions we have come to in our lifetimes of experience are serious matters. People are not held to a high degree of proof that we are splitting semantic hairs. We use, good judgment and common sense and we bear in mind at all times that people probably intend to do what they do in the serious matters in their life and that when we do something" as serious as claiming a $580,000 tax deduction, we are paying attention to what we are'- doing and are aware of the proportionate gravity of that act as above some other act that, we may be involved in Now, this committee knows, from press reports, that the. President had not denied that he owes the money which -was charged against him, a rather vast sum. the. exact figure I do not remember. The press reports also indicate that he has paid the sums due for 1970, 1971 and 1972. But the record shows that he has not yet paid the sum for 1969, the principal of which was $148,000--$148,090.97 which would carry Interest from 1969 and conceivably a negligence penalty of 5 percent which is about $7,500. In the evidence of fraud, one of the most common types of evidence that is produced in our criminal courts. at least, is evidence of concealment, evidence of misrepresentation, because in the orderly affairs of men, we do not conceal something unless we have something to hide. We do not misrepresent unless we do not want the truth known. So quite obviously when we, conceal or misrepresent, that is some indication of intent "of the actor. What evidence do we have in this case? Not a great deal but some that is rather significant. Can you imagine, Mr. Chairman, anybody a charitable deduction of $576,000 more than one-half of his net worth, without giving some fair consideration to that claim Or deduction? Certainly he would not do it casually. Certainly he, would not do it without fully intending to claim it. And certainly he Would have, asked his accountant or his attorney, "Joe, do you really mean I can take $576,000 off?" How often, Mr. Chairman, when you write off your $50 to St. Peter's Church have you wondered whether you had a check to cover it? Can I state and I do state, that our President when he took these deductions, in 1.969 and 1970, and so forth, was not naive. He, knew what be was doing, He had taken the same claim in 1968. And in this instance the appraiser looked it over after the, law had expired. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired. Mr. DANIELSON. And the, deed is backdated. I respectfully submit this is enough evidence to have it considered by the Senate,.